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ADDRESSING CONTROVERSIES ABOUT 






There is significant controversy about the use of experts in child-
related disputes in family and child protection proceedings in 
Canada. The 2015 Lang Review of the Motherisk Laboratory at 
Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children concluded that experts retained 
by child protection agencies were introducing unreliable expert 
testimony about parental drug and alcohol use. The recent decision 
of Ontario Court of Appeal in M. v. F. suggested that evidence from 
a party-retained expert critiquing the opinion of a court-appointed 
psychologist is “rarely” helpful or admissible. This paper addresses 
these and related controversies about the use of experts in child-
related cases. It reviews recent developments in the law governing 
the admissibility of expert evidence, with a particular focus on the 
2015 Supreme Court decision in White Burgess, and the role of the 
judge as a “gatekeeper,” responsible for excluding biased or 
unreliable expert testimony. The paper explores the unique role 
played by court-appointed experts in child-related disputes. It is 
argued that there should be a continued role for experts retained by 
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one parent to critique a report prepared by a court-appointed expert 
in a child-related case; nonetheless there is an obligation for party-
retained experts to provide unbiased and reliable evidence, and 
avoid being “hired guns.”  This critique role may be especially 
important when the state has been involved in the court process, 
either as a party in a child protection proceeding or by arranging 
for a particular court-appointed professional to undertake an 
assessment. It is also argued that there is a strong Charter based 
argument that indigent parents in child protection proceedings may 
be entitled to a court order for funding to retain their own experts to 
testify to counter evidence put forward by experts funded by the 
government. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF EXPERTS IN 
CHILD-RELATED CASES 
 
Since the 1970’s there has been significant use in Canada of court-
appointed experts, usually social workers or psychologists, to 
prepare reports for assistance in the resolution of family and child 
welfare disputes.1 While these reports are frequently important for 
both settlement and judicial decision-making, there is continuing 
debate about when these reports should be ordered, what should be 
the qualifications, 2 training, and supervision of the experts who 
                                                     
1  See e.g., Nicholas Bala, “Assessments for Post-Separation Parenting 
Disputes in Canada” (2004), 42 Fam Ct Rev 485 [Bala, Assessments]. 
2  In one disturbing Ontario situation, a man with some psychological 
education overstated his qualifications and was appointed by family courts 
in the Oshawa area to prepare reports that resulted in individuals losing 
custody of their children. Although he was eventually disciplined by the 
College of Psychologists of Ontario, it is unclear what happened to the 
cases where he testified: see Christie Blatchford, “Man accused of posing 
as psychologist in child-custody disputes,” Globe and Mail (27 January 
2010), online: <wwwtheglobeandmail.com>; Niamh Scallan “Whitby 
therapist Gregory Carter acquitted of fraud charges,” Toronto Star  (10 
Addressing Controversies About Experts in Disputes Over Children 73 
prepare them,3 who should pay for them, and how much weight the 
evidence of these court-appointed experts should receive. There has 
also been recent controversy over the role of the party-retained 
experts in child-related cases. The Lang Review4 of the Motherisk 
Laboratory at Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children concluded that 
experts retained by child protection agencies were introducing 
unreliable expert testimony about parental drug and alcohol use in 
child welfare proceedings. In another development, the 2015 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in M. v. F.5 suggested that 
evidence from a party-retained expert critiquing the opinion of a 
court-appointed psychologist is “rarely” helpful or admissible.6  
 This paper addresses these and related controversies about the 
use of experts in family and child welfare cases involving children 
                                                                                                               
February 2012), online: <www.thestar.com>; and College of Psychologists 
of Ontario, “Discipline Proceedings” (2012) 3:3 The E-bulletin 1, online: < 
http://www.cpo.on.ca/Concerns_and_Complaints.aspx>. 
3  Concerns have, for example, been raised about whether all assessors 
appreciate issues related to spousal violence and abuse; see Shahnaz 
Rahman & Laura Track, Troubling Assessments: Custody and Access 
Reports and Their Equality Implications for BC Women (Vancouver: West 
Coast Leaf, 2012).  
4  Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Motherisk Hair 
Analysis Independent Review, by The Honourable Susan Lang (Ontario: 
Ministry of the Attorney General, 2015), online: 
<www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca> [Lang Review]. In Quebec, a 
hospital-based pediatrician who did work for child protection agencies and 
was under investigation for making unfounded claims of child abuse 
against a number of families recently committed suicide: Aaron Derfel, 
“Montreal child-abuse expert commits suicide ‘under intense social 
pressure’ amid lengthy investigation,” Postmedia News (6 December 
2016), online: <www.nationalpost.com>. 
5  2015 ONCA 277, 58 RFL (7th) 1. 
6  Ibid at paras 41, 34.  
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and parents. We begin by reviewing the law governing the 
admissibility of expert evidence, with a particular focus on the 2015 
Supreme Court decision in White Burgess7 and concerns relating to 
the admissibility, reliability, and impartiality of expert evidence. We 
then consider the unique role played by court-appointed experts in 
child-related disputes, and explore the controversy about when 
courts should order these reports. Next we discuss the application in 
child-related cases of the “cost-benefit” analysis established by the 
Supreme Court for the admissibility of expert evidence proffered by 
party-retained professionals, an approach that requires consideration 
of the reliability and lack of bias of the expert, as well taking 
account of concerns about fairness and the efficiency of the trial 
process; we argue that when dealing with child-related cases, the 
cost-benefit analysis may require a different balancing of factors 
than in the context of other civil or criminal cases. We then consider 
the implications of the Lang Review, arguing that the Charter of 
Rights s.7 requires that in a child protection proceeding the court 
may order that indigent parents receive state funding to retain their 
own experts to testify to counter evidence put forward by experts 
funded by the government. We conclude the paper by offering 
suggestions for addressing the challenges for the appropriate use of 
expert evidence in child-related disputes, and advocating for 
increased government resources to provide this vitally important 
type of evidence.  
 
 Expert evidence often has a central role in the appropriate and 
efficient resolution of child-related disputes, though courts need to 
play a “gate-keeper” role with respect to the ordering of assessments 
and admission of expert testimony. On the facts of M. v. F., there 
were legitimate concerns in that case about the admissibility of 
testimony of the party-retained “critique expert.” However, in our 
                                                     
7  White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton, 2015 SCC 23, 
[2015] 2 SCR 182 [White Burgess]. 
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view the obiter comments in M. v. F. about restricting the 
admissibility of evidence from party-retained experts should not be 
broadly interpreted. We argue that there should continue to be a role 
for experts retained by one parent, to review or critique a report 
prepared by a court-appointed or state-retained expert in a child-
related case, though counsel, judges, and potential expert witnesses 
need to be aware of the obligation for party-retained experts to 
provide unbiased and reliable evidence, and avoid being “hired 
guns.” This critique role may be especially important when the state 
has been involved in the court process, either as a party in a child 
protection proceeding or by arranging for a particular court-
appointed professional to undertake an assessment. There is also a 
need for party-retained experts to be clear about their role and 
ethical obligations; at present, there are no widely accepted 
standards for mental health professionals undertaking a forensic 
review of the work of another professional in the context of child-
related disputes, and appropriate guidelines should be developed by 
professional organizations.   
 
 Since much of the recent controversy about the role of experts in 
child-related cases has been in Ontario, we focus on the legislation 
and jurisprudence in that province, though much of the discussion is 
relevant to other parts of Canada, and we draw upon case law from 
other provinces and territories as well. Indeed, there are 
controversies about use of experts in family and child welfare cases 
throughout the world, and this paper contributes to the on-going 
international debate about whether, when, and how to make use of 
expert evidence in these most important cases. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BEING AN “EXPERT”: 
RELIABILITY AND BIAS CONCERNS 
 
In this part of the paper we review the principles of the law 
governing the admissibility of expert evidence, with particular focus 
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on the issues that most commonly arise in connection with experts in 
child-related cases: impartiality, qualifications, participant experts, 
and reliability. 
 
Generally, witnesses can only testify about what they did, 
observed, or heard.8 Witnesses who are qualified as “experts” may 
testify about their “opinions,” including the state of knowledge in 
their field, and quote from texts they consider “authoritative.” As the 
responsibility of drawing inferences or conclusions is generally the 
responsibility of the trier of fact, in order to be accepted as an expert 
witness and express an opinion, a person must “possess special 
knowledge and experience going beyond that of the trier of fact.” 9 
Experts may relate their knowledge of the field to the specific case 
before the court and express opinions about the issues before the 
court, though an expert cannot testify that a particular witness is 
credible (or not), as this would violate the rule against “oath 
helping.”10 The Supreme Court held in R. v. Mohan11 that the closer 
an expert witness comes to expressing an opinion about the 
“ultimate issue” in a case, the more judicial scrutiny there should 
                                                     
8  There is scope for lay witnesses to express “lay opinion” about matters 
such as the age or sobriety of a person whom they observed: Gratt v R, 
[1980] 2 SCR 819, 144 DLR (3d) 267. “Lay opinion” is commonly 
admitted in child-related cases, both from professionals—such as child 
protection workers—and relatives of parents, about such issues as whether 
parents are being affectionate with their children or not. This issue of lay 
opinion evidence from child protection workers is discussed in later 
sections of this paper. 
9  R v Marquard, [1993] 4 SCR 223, 108 DLR (4th) 47 [Marquard]. 
10  See R v Béland, [1987] 2 SCR 398, 43 DLR (4th) 641, and Whitfield v 
Whitfield, 2016 ONCA 581. 
11 R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9, 114 DLR (4th) 243 [Mohan]. 
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be concerning the admissibility of this evidence. 12 However, in 
child-related proceedings, it is common for professionals, especially 
court-appointed experts, to express their opinion about the ultimate 
issue: the best interests of the child.13  
 
JUDGES AS “GATEKEEPERS”: THE ADMISSIBILITY 
THRESHOLD AND THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
  
In its 1994 decision in R. v. Mohan,14 the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that judges must be “gatekeepers” for the admission of “expert 
testimony.” More recently, Cromwell J. in the 2015 Supreme Court 
decision White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton 
observed that since 1994, the “unmistakeable overall trend of the 
jurisprudence … has been to tighten the admissibility requirements 
and to enhance the judge’s gatekeeping role.”15 While White 
Burgess is broadly consistent with Mohan, it refined and clarified 
the test for the admissibility of expert evidence, specifically the need 
to establish the reliability and impartiality of an expert’s testimony.  
 
                                                     
12  Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added]: “expert evidence which advances a novel 
scientific theory or technique is subjected to special scrutiny to determine 
whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability and whether it is essential in 
the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a satisfactory 
conclusion without the assistance of the expert. The closer the evidence 
approaches an opinion on an ultimate issue, the stricter the application of 
this principle.” 
13  See e.g., M v F, supra note 5; CLB v JAB, 2016 SKCA 101, [2016] SJ 430. 
For statutory provisions establishing the centrality of the “best interests of 
the child,” see e.g Ontario, Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C-12, 
s 24 (parenting disputes); and Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c 
C-11, s 38(3) (child protection).  
14  Mohan, supra note 11.  
15  White Burgess, supra note 7 at para 20. 
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 Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
expressed concerns regarding the “dangers” of the admission of 
expert evidence, including that it may result in a trial becoming a 
“contest of experts,” with expert evidence potentially distracting the 
trier of fact rather than assisting.16 The Court observed that the trial 
process must not become an “attornment to the opinion of the 
expert,” a possibility “exacerbated by the fact that expert evidence is 
often resistant to effective cross-examination by counsel who are not 
experts in that field.”17 The Court has also expressed concerns 
regarding expert evidence prolonging the trial process and leading to 
an inordinate expenditure of court time and expense for the parties.18 
Issues of unfairness and of lack of resources to properly challenge an 
expert retained by a government agency may be especially critical 
when a litigant has very limited resources, as is often the case in 
child protection proceedings.  
 
 The Supreme Court has also recognized the need for courts to 
scrutinize the underlying science or body of knowledge that an 
expert relies upon. Experts may overstate the reliability of their tests 
and opinions, and there is risk of the admission of testimony based 
on “junk science.”19 If the expert evidence is based upon a “novel” 
or “contested science,” or science used for a novel purpose, the 
                                                     
16  Mohan, supra note 11 at 24. Professor Rollie Thompson argues that the 
Supreme Court has displayed “deep skepticism, even suspicion” about the 
value of expert testimony based on social science research in the 
criminal trial process: DA Rollie Thompson, “Are There Any Rules of 
Evidence in Family Law?” (2003), 21 Can Fam L Q 245 at 276. 
17  R v DD, 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 SCR 275 at para 55. 
18  Mohan, supra note 11; Supra note 17 at para 56. 
19  R v J-LJ, 2000 SCC 51, [2000] 2 SCR 600 at para 25. 
Addressing Controversies About Experts in Disputes Over Children 79 
reliability of the underlying science for that purpose should be 
sufficiently proven before the evidence is admitted.20  
 
 It is worth emphasizing that the trial judge’s role as a 
“gatekeeper” arises even if opposing counsel does not object to the 
admission of the expert testimony, and arises in judge alone trials as 
well as jury trials.21  In Mohan, Sopinka J. held that the party 
seeking to call an expert must establish that four “threshold” criteria 
of admissibility have been satisfied:22  
 
x Relevance;23  
x Necessity in assisting the trier of fact; that is providing 
information likely outside the knowledge and experience of 
the jury or judge; Sopinka J. stated that the word “helpful 
sets too low a standard,” but he also said he “would not 
judge necessity by too high a standard;” 24 
x A properly qualified expert; and 
                                                     
20  Ibid at paras 33, 35–36, and 47; see also R v Trochym, 2007 SCC 6, [2007] 
1 SCR 239 at para 27. 
21  R v Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15, [2014] 1 SCR 272 at para 46, per Moldaver J. 
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court. Despite ruling the trial judge 
erred in admitting the expert testimony, the Court upheld the conviction as 
there was other “overwhelming” evidence of guilt. 
22  R v Mohan, supra note 11, at paras 17–21. 
23  White Burgess, supra note 7, at para 23.  The concept of “relevance” was 
explained in R v Shafia, 2016 ONCA 812, at para 227, by Watt JA: “The 
expert opinion evidence must have a tendency, as a matter of human 
experience and logic, to make the existence or non-existence of a fact in 
issue more or less likely than it would be without the evidence.” 
24  R v Mohan, supra note 11, at para 26. 
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x The absence of any exclusionary rule that would preclude 
the admission of the expert evidence.25 
 
The Court also stated that a "basic threshold of reliability" for 
expert evidence must be established before the admissibility of the 
evidence can be considered. The accused in Mohan was a pediatrician 
charged with sexually assaulting four adolescent female patients 
during medical examinations. The accused wanted to call a 
psychiatrist with expertise in treating sexual offenders as a witness 
to testify that the accused did not fit within the “limited and unusual 
group” of physicians who would commit such offences. The 
psychiatrist was prepared to testify that, in his opinion, the accused, 
as a medical doctor, did not have the “extra abnormal, extra 
component for the abnormality” that he would have had to possess 
to abuse these adolescents, since he would have been violating “the 
very strict professional norms against sexual involvement with 
patients.”26 The trial judge ruled that the psychiatrist could not testify 
before the jury. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, as the 
proposed evidence was regarded as mere “personal opinion” and not 
sufficiently “reliable” or grounded in research.27  
 
In addition to the four criteria and reliability, Mohan established 
that judges have a residual responsibility to undertake a “cost-benefit” 
analysis of admissibility, and can exercise residual discretion to 
exclude otherwise admissible expert evidence if its prejudicial effect 
outweighs its  probative value.28 This includes consideration of 
                                                     
25  One of the most common exclusionary rules that may preclude the use of 
expert evidence is the rule against “oath helping,” which precludes an 
expert from directly testifying about the credibility of another witness. 
26  Mohan, supra note 11, at para. 8. 
27  Ibid at para. 49. 
28  Ibid at para 21; White Burgess, supra note 7 at para 19. 
Addressing Controversies About Experts in Disputes Over Children 81 
prejudice to a fair trial, the costs imposed on the parties and court by 
admitting such evidence, and potential costs for the rebuttal of the 
expert evidence. 
 
In White Burgess,29 Cromwell J., writing for a unanimous Court, 
reviewed and synthesized the law governing admission of expert 
evidence, and largely adopted the two-step approach to Mohan put 
forward by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Abbey.30 Justice 
Cromwell wrote: 
 
At the first step, the proponent of the evidence must 
establish the threshold requirements of admissibility. 
These are the four Mohan factors (relevance, 
necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule and a 
properly qualified expert) and in addition, in the case 
of an opinion based on novel or contested science or 
science used for a novel purpose, the reliability of the 
underlying science for that purpose . . . Evidence that 
does not meet these threshold requirements should be 
excluded. . . . At the second discretionary gatekeeping 
step, the judge balances the potential risks and 
benefits of admitting the evidence in order to decide 
whether the potential benefits justify the risks. . . . 
Doherty J.A. summed it up well in Abbey, stating that 
the “trial judge must decide whether expert evidence 
that meets the preconditions to admissibility is 
sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant 
its admission despite the potential harm to the trial 
process that may flow from the admission of the 
                                                     
29  White Burgess, supra note 7. 
30  R v Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, 97 OR (3d) 330 [Abbey], leave to appeal 
refused Warren Nigel Abbey v Her Majesty the Queen, 2010 CanLii 37826 
(SCC), [2010] SCCA No 125.    
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expert evidence.”31 
 
Trial judges must determine whether the four threshold 
conditions of admissibility are satisfied. If they are, the judge must 
also be satisfied that the evidence meets a threshold of “reliability” 
and then undertake a discretionary cost-benefit analysis. If the 
evidence is admitted, the trier of fact must ultimately determine what 
weight to give it. Thus, issues of reliability and bias may be 
considered at each stage. 
 
Despite the cautious stance of the Supreme Court in Mohan and 
subsequent cases towards expert evidence, a theme of White Burgess 
is that trial courts also have a discretionary role and must undertake 
a “cost-benefit analysis” for the admissibility of expert evidence. In 
White Burgess, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge had been 
too strict in applying this analysis and had erred in excluding the 
testimony of an expert’s statement on the grounds of possible bias 
based on an economic relationship to a party to the litigation. When 
dealing with child-related cases, the cost-benefit analysis may 
require a different balancing of factors than in the context of other 
civil or criminal cases; child-related cases never involve a jury and 
always require judges to make decisions about the future of a child 
who is not a party to the proceedings; thus, the costs of admission of 
expert evidence may be lower and the benefits greater. However, 
even in child-related cases, there is reason for caution in the 
admission of expert evidence and judicial scrutiny of its reliability.  
 
QUALIFICATION AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 
 
A party putting forward a person as an “expert” has the onus of 
establishing the area of that person’s expertise, and further, that it is 
                                                     
31  White Burgess supra note 7 at paras 23–24. Citations within quotation 
omitted. 
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an appropriate area for introduction of expert evidence.32 Unless the 
opposing party consents to introduction of the expert evidence, there 
should be a voir dire to determine the qualifications and nature of 
expertise of the proposed witness.  
 
 Most commonly the voir dire will focus on the first issue, the 
qualifications and expertise of the particular expert.”33 The expertise 
of the witness is typically established by providing the curriculum 
vitae, and indicating whether the person has been accepted in other 
similar cases as an expert (which is not determinative, but helpful). 
The expertise may be acquired through education or experience, or a 
combination of the two.  It is often helpful to establish qualifications 
within the field of expertise as well, for example by having a record 
of being a presenter at professional education programs or 
conducting peer-reviewed research. For some child-related issues, 
such as a child welfare agency staff person expressing an opinion 
about the adoptability of a child, significant professional experience 
working in the field may be sufficient to allow a witness to provide 
an opinion.34 Other matters, particularly related to psychological 
testing or making a mental health diagnosis, clearly require formal 
qualifications and professional accreditation before a person can be 
qualified to express an opinion.35  
 
 
                                                     
32  White Burgess, supra note 7; Mohan, supra note 11.   
33  See Rollie Thompson, “The Ten Evidence ‘Rules’ that Every Family Law 
Lawyer Needs to Know” (2016), 35 Can Fam LQ 285 at 289. 
34  See e.g., Children & Family Services for York Region v W(T), 2004 
CarswellOnt 2430, [2004] OJ 2541. 
35  See e.g., Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton v W(A), 2016 ONCJ 358, 
2016 CarswellOnt 9713. 
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NOVEL ISSUES: “RELIABILITY” IN HARD AND SOFT 
SCIENCES 
 
A more complicated issue that may arise at the voir dire stage is 
whether there is a body of knowledge that is sufficiently reliable to 
allow it to be the subject of expert testimony. As observed by Charron 
J. (as she then was) in R. v. Olscamp (a case where she refused to 
permit an expert to testify in a child sexual abuse prosecution that the 
complainant’s condition was “consistent” with having been sexually 
abused) the issue was not the qualifications of a particular witness, but 
whether anyone could give the proposed expert testimony having 
regard to the present state of knowledge in the field.36 As noted by 
Charron J.A. (as she then was) in R. v. A.K.:  
 
The evidence must meet a certain threshold of 
reliability in order to have sufficient probative value to 
meet the criterion of relevance. The relevance of the 
evidence must also be considered with respect to the 
second criterion of necessity. After all, it could hardly 
be said that the admission of unreliable scientific 
evidence is necessary for a proper adjudication to be 
made by the trier of fact.37  
  
 Some cases, like the American precedent in Daubert v. Merrill 
Dow Pharmaceuticals,38 state that expert evidence must have a 
“scientific basis” to be reliable and admissible. It is, for example, the 
basis of scientific research in the biological, medical, and physical 
sciences (“hard sciences”) to use control groups and randomized 
                                                     
36  R v Olscamp, 1994 CarswellOnt 114, 35 CR (4th) 37 (Ont SC), at para 7.  
37  R v AK, [1999] OJ 3280, 176 DLR (4th) 665 (CA) at para 84, per Charron 
JA. 
38  509 US 579, 113 S Ct 2786 (1993). 
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studies, and expert evidence in these areas requires a foundation in 
this type of research. However, even for expert evidence in hard 
sciences to be considered “reliable,” the expert need not testify with 
certainty as to a particular opinion. Experts will often testify in terms 
of probabilities, and all tests have some type of “error rate.”39  
 
At some point the error rate or uncertainty of a particular test or 
area of knowledge becomes sufficiently high that a court may decide 
it is insufficiently reliable to admit expert evidence based on this 
type of test or in this area. An example of testing that does not meet 
threshold reliability for admission in court is phallometric testing,40 
which is commonly used by clinicians working with sexual 
offenders to measure progress in treatment, and is sometimes 
                                                     
39  Some forensic tests are sometimes said to have a “zero error rate,” but this 
is the theoretical compared to actual error rate, as there are human 
proficiency issues that affect even “fool proof tests.” For example, some 
interesting work has been done on errors in finger print testing. While 
everyone has unique fingerprints (even identical twins who have the same 
DNA), a study of American fingerprint experts found a false positive rate 
of 0.5% and a false negative rate of 7.5%: Bradford T. Ulerya et al, 
“Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent fingerprint decisions” (2011) 
108:19 PNAS 7733–7738. There is less research on forensic DNA testing, 
which (except for identical twins) has theoretical error rates of 
approximately 1 in a billion, but actual error rates due to sample 
contamination and human error might be as high as 1 in a thousand: 
Mueller, L.D., “Forensic DNA Laboratory Error Rates”, (22 April 2002), 
Online: <http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/~mueller/>. Retesting by an independent 
lab would almost always prevent human error for DNA evidence, and 
double checking forensic labs will reduce it. 
40 As discussed in R v J-LJ, 2000 SCC 51, [2000] SCJ No 52, Phallometric 
testing (or Penile Plethysmography) involves attachment of sensors to a 
man’s penis while he is shown various images, including ones showing 
adult consensual sexual images and images of naked children, and is 
intended to detect sexual arousal to children.  
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considered by police or child protection workers in their 
investigations to help establish whether a man is likely to have 
sexually abused a child. While useful for clinical and investigative 
purposes, due to concerns about reliability, judges in criminal and 
child protection cases have generally refused to admit testimony 
based on the results of phallometric testing to help determine 
whether a man sexually abused a child.41  
 
Although there is utility in having expert evidence based on 
physical (hard) sciences, with its often-precise measurements and 
apparent certainty, there are also limitations and dangers to this type 
of evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the trial process must 
not, in effect, become an “attornment to the opinion of the expert,” a 
possibility “exacerbated by the fact that expert evidence is resistant 
to effective cross-examination by counsel who are not experts in that 
field.”42 Few lawyers have the academic background or knowledge 
to effectively review and understand scientific literature or cross-
examine an expert testifying based on hard sciences. The reality is 
that many judges lack the scientific background to effectively assess 
the evidence of a hard science expert in the absence of effective 
cross-examination or a testimony from an expert with a different 
opinion. Later in this paper we discuss the overreliance on evidence 
of drug and alcohol tests from the Motherisk Laboratory, and return 
to this issue and the importance of having an expert for the parents 
                                                     
41  Ibid. See also Children's Aid Society of Algoma v ML, [2012] OJ No 3292 
(OCJ); Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel v SR-T, [2003] OJ 6146 
(OCJ) . In the latter case, there was evidence that there was a “significant 
risk” of false negatives and a “false positive rate” of 4–21%. While 
generally not admissible at the trial stage, it is sometimes considered as a 
part of the testimony of an expert based in part on phallometric testing at 
sentencing or the dangerous offender stage of a criminal case because of the 
lower standard for the admission of evidence. 
42  R v DD, 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 SCR 275 at para 55. 
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or defence to assist in the challenging of an expert called by the 
Crown or child protection agency, especially one testifying based on 
“hard science.”   
 
The courts have recognized that there must be different 
standards for the admission of evidence from experts regarding 
“soft” or social and behavioural sciences compared to testimony 
based on medical or other hard sciences. There are important areas, 
especially in child-related disputes, where the expert’s opinion is 
dependent on knowledge of social science literature and clinical 
experience rather than reliance on reporting results of a test based on 
rigorous scientific methodology. In R. v. Abbey, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that in deciding whether to admit expert testimony by a 
sociologist called by the Crown about the meaning of a “teardrop” 
tattoo within street gang culture, the Crown needed to establish 
“threshold reliability” of the proposed expert’s testimony. Doherty 
J.A. held that the voir dire into the admissibility of the expert’s 
testimony could address such issues as: 
 
1. To what extent is the field in which the opinion is 
offered a recognized discipline, profession or area of 
specialized training? 
2. To what extent is the work within that field subject 
to quality assurance measures and appropriate 
independent review by others in the field? 
3. To the extent that the opinion rests on data 
accumulated through various means such as 
interviews, is the data accurately recorded, stored 
and available? 
4. To what extent are the reasoning processes 
underlying the opinion and the methods used to 
gather the relevant information clearly explained by 
the witness and susceptible to critical examination 
by a jury? 
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5. To what extent has the expert arrived at his or her 
opinion using methodologies accepted by those 
working in the particular field in which the opinion 
is advanced? 
6. To what extent has the witness, in advancing the 
opinion, honoured the boundaries and limits of the 
discipline from which his or her expertise arises? 
7. To what extent is the proffered opinion based on 
data and other information gathered independently 
of the specific case or, more broadly, the litigation 
process?43 
 
In Abbey, the Court of Appeal also commented: 
 
Admissibility is not an all or nothing proposition. . . . 
The trial judge may admit part of the proffered 
testimony, modify the nature or scope of the proposed 
opinion, or edit the language used to frame that 
opinion. 44   
 
The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in not permitting 
the sociologist called by the Crown to testify about the range of 
possible meanings of the tattoo, including that it signified the wearer 
had killed a rival gang member, but ruled that the expert could not 
                                                     
43  Abbey, supra note 30 at para 119.  See also R v Shafia, supra note 23 at 
para 240, where the Court of Appeal upheld the admissibility of expert 
evidence called by the Crown about culture and “honour killings,” with 
Watt J.A. observing: “Scientific validity is not a condition precedent to the 
admissibility of expert opinion evidence. Indeed, the great bulk of expert 
opinion evidence admitted in our courts is given by experts in disciplines 
that do not use the scientific method and whose opinions cannot be 
scientifically validated.” 
44  Supra note 30 at para 63. 
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testify that the tattoo had only one specific meaning that amounted 
to a “confession” of the “ultimate issue” of murder. 
 
While social science expert evidence may be admissible, and 
sometimes is highly relevant and persuasive, there may be concerns 
about its reliability. This is especially true when party-retained 
professionals, such police officers or child protection workers, 
address issues of “common experience” or credibility.45 However, 
lawyers without access to a consultant or expert with relevant 
knowledge may find it less challenging to cross-examine an expert 
testifying based on social science knowledge or professional 
experience than one testifying based on research in the physical 
sciences. Further, most judges have greater professional experience 
with issues in the “soft sciences,” and can better assess the reliability 
of social science expert testimony. Judges may be better able to limit 
the weight of expert evidence regarding behavioural or social 
science than evidence from a “hard scientist” whose testimony may 
not be fully comprehended.  
                                                     
45  See for example R v Sekhon, supra note 21. 
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WHITE BURGESS AND IMPARTIALITY 
 
In White Burgess, the central issue was the allegation of bias of a 
party’s expert, and its effect on the admissibility of the testimony as 
expert evidence. Justice Cromwell held that if an expert witness does 
not meet a “threshold requirement” for impartiality, his or her evidence 
should not be admitted. If the witness meets the threshold, but 
questions remain concerning impartiality, an apprehension of bias may 
be a factor in the discretionary “cost-benefit analysis” of admissibility, 
or in the weighing of the evidence.46 To establish impartiality for 
threshold admissibility, Cromwell J. stated: 
 
The expert’s opinion must be impartial in the sense 
that it reflects an objective assessment of the 
questions at hand. It must be independent in the sense 
that it is the product of the expert’s independent 
judgment, uninfluenced by who has retained him or 
her or the outcome of the litigation. It must be 
unbiased in the sense that it does not unfairly favour 
one party’s position over another. The acid test is 
whether the expert’s opinion would not change 
regardless of which party retained him or her. . . .47  
 
Justice Cromwell and the case’s outcome make clear that it will 
be the “quite rare” case where expert evidence is excluded on the 
basis of lack of “impartiality” due to a professional relationship with 
one of the parties.48 Justice Cromwell provided some examples 
where expert testimony was excluded due to lack of impartiality, 
                                                     
46  Supra note 7 at para 10. 
47 Ibid at para 32. Emphasis added. 
48  Ibid at para 49. 
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including: the proposed expert was acting as counsel for one of the 
parties; the expert was a party to the litigation him or herself; and the 
expert’s retainer agreement was inappropriate because it was 
contingent on a particular opinion or outcome.49 On its facts, White 
Burgess indicates that a witness having a professional relationship 
with a party, such as an accountant or therapist, does not normally 
preclude that professional from giving expert evidence supporting 
the party’s position in the litigation, as long as it is an honestly held 
opinion founded on professional knowledge and expertise. With 
regards to the procedure of proving impartiality, Cromwell J. wrote: 
 
While I would not go so far as to hold that the expert's 
independence and impartiality should be presumed 
absent challenge, my view is that absent such 
challenge, the expert's attestation or testimony 
recognizing and accepting the duty will generally be 
sufficient to establish that this threshold is met. . . . 
This threshold requirement is not particularly onerous 
and it will likely be quite rare that a proposed expert's 
evidence would be ruled inadmissible for failing to 
meet it. The trial judge must determine, having regard 
to both the particular circumstances of the proposed 
expert and the substance of the proposed evidence, 
whether the expert is able and willing to carry out his 
or her primary duty to the court.50 
 
Justice Cromwell notes that in determining exclusion of an 
expert’s evidence, it is the nature and extent of the relationship 
between the expert and the party who has retained that expert that is 
relevant, rather than the fact that there is a relationship. He cautioned 
                                                     
49  Ibid at para 37. 
50  Ibid at paras 47–49. Emphasis added. 
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that “[a]nything less than clear unwillingness or inability to [provide 
the court with fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence] should not 
lead to exclusion” but instead would go to weight.51 According to 
Cromwell J., possible bias should be addressed when considering 
whether an expert is properly qualified as part of the “threshold” 
inquiry,52 as well as in the cost-benefit analysis discretionary 
decision made by the trial judge to exclude otherwise admissible 
expert evidence.53  If the testimony is admitted, bias may still also be 
a factor in weighing it. 
 
PARTICIPANT AND LITIGATION EXPERTS 
 
If a person is called as an expert witness, provisions like Ontario’s 
Family Law Rules normally require that notice and a copy of the 
expert’s report be served on the other parties so they can adequately 
prepare to cross-examine the expert.54  When a party is seeking to 
have the court rely on expert evidence, the party proffering the 
evidence should be prepared to establish the witness’ qualifications 
and to have the expert cross-examined on the report, unless the other 
party agrees to waive the appearance and accept the admission of the 
report without the person testifying.  
 
                                                     
51  Ibid at para 49. 
52  Ibid at para 53. 
53  Ibid at para 54. See ibid at para 24 where Cromwell J. (adopting the 
approach of Doherty J.A. in Abbey, supra note 30) observed that despite 
passing the first step of Mohan, a trial judge must still evaluate whether the 
evidence is “sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant its 
admission despite the potential harm to the trial process that may flow” 
from its admission. 
54  Ontario Family Law Rules, O Reg 439/07, r 20.1 [Family Law Rules]. 
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Recently, Ontario courts have begun to differentiate between 
“participant experts” and “litigation experts,” a distinction with 
potential procedural significance in many family and child welfare 
cases.55 A “litigation expert” is an expert specifically retained by a 
party to provide opinion testimony about a matter in dispute in 
litigation. A party calling such an expert has the obligation of 
providing an expert report to the court and other parties well in 
advance of the proceeding, pursuant to the Ontario Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 53.0156 and the Family Law Rules, Rule 20.1.  
  
A “participant expert” is a professional who has provided 
services and had a relationship with a person apart from the 
litigation, and is later called as an expert witness to provide an 
opinion in ongoing litigation. In the context of child-related 
litigation, a participant expert may be a physician or therapist who 
has provided care or treatment to a child or parent, and then is called 
as an expert to testify about the person’s treatment and express an 
opinion about that person based on his or her professional 
knowledge. The rules for the prior filing of “an expert report” do not 
apply to a participant expert, as that professional had an on-going 
relationship with the person, and is likely to a play a lesser role in 
expressing opinions about the “ultimate issues” in a case.57 This 
typically reduces the cost and complexity of involving such a 
professional in the litigation. However, as with other witnesses in 
civil cases, there is an obligation in family cases on parties calling 
                                                     
55  Westerhof v Gee Estate, 2015 ONCA 206, 124 OR (3d) 721. 
56  RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 53.01.  
57   Ibid. 
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such a witness to disclose the substance of the testimony prior to a 
hearing.58 
 
While the rules for prior filing of an expert report do not apply 
to participant experts, the court should be satisfied that the criteria 
for admission of expert testimony have been satisfied before 
considering that witness’s opinion evidence. As with other expert 
witnesses, this would entail consideration of both expertise and 
impartiality for the admissibility and weighting of the testimony.59 
 
COURT-ORDERED ASSESSMENTS IN CHILD-RELATED 
CASES 
 
In all Canadian jurisdictions, a judge in a family60 or child protection 
proceeding61 has the jurisdiction to appoint a mental health 
                                                     
58  See e.g., Family Law Rules, r 23. The disclosure requirements of Rule 23 
are important, but considerably less onerous than the requirements for 
notice and provision of information under Rule 20.1 for expert witnesses.  
59  White Burgess, supra note 7. 
60  In Canada assessments can be ordered in Alberta, Rules of Court, Alta Reg 
390/68, r 218; British Columbia, Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 128, 
s 15; Manitoba, The Family Maintenance Act, CCSM c. F20, s 3 and Court 
of Queen’s Bench Act, CCSM c C280, s 49; New Brunswick, Judicature 
Act, RSNB 1973, c J-2, s 11.4; Newfoundland, Children’s Law Act, RSN 
1990, c C-13, s 36; Northwest Territories, Children’s Law Act, SNWT 
1997, c 14, s 29; Nova Scotia, Judicature Act, RSNS 1990, c J-4, s 32F and 
Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, s 19; Ontario, 
Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C-12, s 30 and Courts of Justice 
Act, RSO 1990, c C-12, s 112; Prince Edward Island, Custody Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Act, RSPEI, c C-33, s 4.1; Yukon, Children’s Act, RSY 
1986, c 22, s 43. It has also been held that a superior court has an inherent 
jurisdiction to order an assessment: Cillis v Cillis, 1980 CarswellOnt 315, 
20 RFL (2d) 208 (Ont HC).   
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professional to undertake an assessment62 of the child and parents in 
order to provide a report for the court and the parties. Such court-
appointed experts have a unique role, testifying partially about the 
results of their factual investigations, and partially about their opinions.  
 
There is a significant body of social science literature on 
conducting child custody and access assessments in family cases and 
parenting capacity assessments in child protection cases.63 A number 
of professional organizations and regulatory bodies have developed 
                                                                                                               
61  See e.g., Ontario Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C-11, s 54; 
and Court Ordered Assessments, Ontario Reg 25/07; and Child Youth and 
Family Enhancement Act, SA 2004, c 16, s 21.1(3)(b). 
62  Child custody and access “assessments” is the term used in Canada for 
these court-ordered expert reports in family cases, while the term child 
custody “evaluations” or “forensic evaluations” is more often used in the 
United States. In child protection cases, these are often called “parenting 
capacity assessments.” 
63   See e.g., Leslie Drozd,  Nancy Olesen & Michael Saini, Parenting Plan & 
Child Custody Evaluations: Using Decision Trees to Increase Evaluator 
Competence & Avoid Preventable Errors (Sarasota, FL: Professional 
Resource Press, 2013); Rachel Birnbaum, Barbara Jo Fidler & Katherine 
Kavassalis, Child Custody and Access Assessments: A Resource Guide for 
Legal and Mental Health Professionals (Toronto: Thomson Carswell 
Publishing, 2008); Jonathan Gould & David Martindale, The Art and 
Science of Child Custody Evaluations (New York: Guilford Press, 2007); 
Philip Michael Stahl, Conducting Child Custody Evaluations: A 
Comprehensive Guide (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999); 
American Psychological Association (APA), “Guidelines for Child 
Custody Evaluations in Family Law Proceedings” (2010) 65:9 AM Psychol 
863; and Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC), “Model 
Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation” (2007), 45 Fam Ct 
Rev 70. 
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guidelines for conducting assessments in family64 and child 
protection proceedings.65 Although there is not a single standardized 
methodology, the assessment process is invariably  “multimodal,” 
involving a range of ways of gaining an understanding of the needs 
of children, the capacities of the parents, and the relationship of each 
parent and child. Interviews with parents and children and 
observation of parent-child interactions are very important parts of 
the process.  
 
An assessor will also usually review court documents and 
previous reports about family members, and contact “collateral 
sources”; various individuals who know the family, including 
professionals like teachers and coaches, as well as neighbours, 
relatives, and new partners. If a psychologist is involved, there may 
be psychological testing of the parents, and perhaps children, though 
there are no tests that can conclusively establish who is a good 
parent, or what child care arrangement will be “best” for a child. If 
psychological testing is used, the psychologist should be familiar 
with the current literature and latest versions of the tests, as well as 
                                                     
64  See e.g., Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers, 
“Practice Guidelines for Custody and Access Assessments”, (1 September 
2009), online: <http://ocswssw.org>; Gregory Stevens "Custody and 
Access Assessments in Saskatchewan: Format, Process, and a Practitioner’s 
Opinion”, (September 2004), online: 
<http://redengine.lawsociety.sk.ca/inmagicgenie/documentfolder/AC5609.p
df>; Newfoundland & Labrador Association of Social Workers, “Standards 
for Child Custody and Access Assessments”, (8 January 2007), online: 
<http://www.nlasw.ca>. 
65  T Pezzot-Pearce & J Pearce, Parenting Assessments in Child Welfare 
Cases: A Practical Guide (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004); 
Peter Choate & Karen Hudson, “Parenting Capacity Assessments: When 
They Serve and When They Detract in Child Protection Matters” (2014) 33 
Can Fam LQ. 
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their limitations, especially for the particular parents and children 
being assessed.  
 
The professional who conducts a court-ordered assessment 
should have relevant knowledge, expertise, and experience. 
Assessors also need to understand the cultural context of the parents 
and children, which may be especially important in child protection 
cases.66 There is also growing awareness of the complexity of cases 
that involve children with special needs (e.g., learning disabilities, 
physical health issues, cognitive delay, Asperger Spectrum 
Disorder), refusal to visit a parent, or where parents have a high 
conflict separation, especially if it involves domestic violence, or 
one or both parents have substance abuse or mental health 
problems.67 These cases require a specialized assessment and 
analysis, in addition to the mental health professional being 
competent and qualified in understanding child development, 
attachment, family dynamics, and knowledge of relevant case law 
and legal standards. 
                                                     
66  See e.g., Karen S. Budd, "Assessing Parenting Capacity in a Child Welfare 
Context" (2005), 27:4 Children & Youth Services Rev 429; and Sandra 
Azar & Linda Cote, "Sociocultural issues in the evaluation of the needs of 
children in custody decision making: What do our current frameworks for 
evaluating parenting practices have to offer?" (2002) 25:3 Int'l JL & 
Psychiatry 193–217. 
67  Birnbaum, Fidler & Kavassalis, supra note 63; Rachel Birnbaum et al., 
“Co-parenting Children with Neurodevelopmental Disorders” in Kathryn 
Kuehnle & Leslie Drozd, eds, Parenting Plan Evaluations: Applied 
Research for the Family Court (New York: Oxford UP, 2016) 270; Jo 
Fidler, Nicholas Bala & Michael Saini, Children Who Resist Post-
separation Parental Contact: A Differential Approach for Legal and 
Mental Health Professionals (New York: Oxford UP, 2012). On the issue of 
concern about whether assessors have adequate training in dealing with cases 
involving domestic violence, see e.g., Rahman & Track, supra note 3. 
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While the assessment process should be informed by social 
science research, assessors will inevitably also engage in assessing 
the credibility of different sources of information and establishing a 
factual basis for their opinions, and using their own individual 
professional judgement, experience, and values in formulating 
recommendations. The broad concerns about reliability, impartiality, 
trial efficiency, and fairness that apply to the admission and 
weighing of expert evidence are also relevant to assessment reports. 
However, there are unique features of the court-ordered assessment 
process that result in some differences in the legal treatment of 
party-retained experts and court-appointed assessors.  
 
In practice, many requests for an assessment are informal and 
made on consent. While assessments can be very useful for the parties 
and court, and can facilitate settlement and judicial decision-making, 
the process is intrusive for both parents and children, so there is 
understandable judicial scrutiny if the request for an assessment is 
opposed. Further, the assessment process is expensive (often starting in 
the range of $5,000 to $10,000, potentially much higher) and can take 
months to complete, possibly delaying a trial. 
 
In all provinces, if the court orders an assessment in a child 
protection case, it is almost always paid for by the government. In 
family cases, in all provinces a judge can direct that one or both parents 
pay for an assessment, provided that they have the means. Courts in 
some provinces also have limited authority to direct or request that a 
government agency fund the preparation of an assessment in a family 
case, but the agency will usually select the assessor. In Ontario, for 
example, the court can order that parents pay for an assessment under 
the Children’s Law Reform Act s. 30, in which case a specific 
professional, often a psychologist, will be identified in the order to 
prepare the report, but this is only realistic if the parents have 
significant resources as the parents must pay for this type of report.  
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An Ontario court may also direct that the Office of the Children’s 
Lawyer (OCL) consider involvement in a family case. The OCL will 
decide whether to appoint a lawyer for the child, undertake a “clinical 
investigation,” or do both or neither. While there is no charge to 
parents for the involvement of the OCL, for budgetary reasons it is 
only involved in about half of the family cases where there is a judicial 
request,68 most often to provide a “clinical investigation report,” 
usually prepared by a social worker designated by the Office. As a 
result of government budgetary limits and parental lack of resources to 
pay for an assessment, there are many family cases where it would be 
desirable to have a court-appointed expert report, but none is available.  
 
While most court-appointed assessments are undertaken on a 
consensual basis, often reflected in a consent order, there are cases 
where one party requests an assessment and the other party objects. 
There is some controversy in the jurisprudence over the test courts 
should apply when the judge must rule on whether or not to order 
an assessment. Some cases have taken a relatively narrow approach, 
concluding there needs to be a “clinical issue” to order an 
assessment in a family case. 69 In the 2012 Ontario case of Baille v. 
Middleton, Pazaratz J. reviewed the case law and adopted a “clinical 
issues” test for determining when to order an assessment, 
concluding:  
 
Assessments should be limited to cases in which there 
are clinical issues to be determined, in order that such 
                                                     
68  For concerns about the inability of the OCL to fill all requests for service 
and delays in responding to requests, see Ontario Office of the Auditor 
General, 2013 Auditor General’s Annual Report (2013), Chapter 4, Section 
4.10. 
69  See e.g., Linton v Clarke (1993), 50 RFL (3d) 8 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)), affd 10 
RFL (4th) 92, 21 OR (3d) 568 (Div Ct). 
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assessments can provide expert evidence on the 
appropriate manner to address the emotional and 
psychological stresses within the family unit in the 
final determination of custody. . . . Clinical issues 
have been loosely defined as being “those behavioral 
or psychological issues about which the average 
reasonable person would need assistance in 
understanding . . . not limited to psychiatric illness or 
serious psychological impairment.”70 
 
Most cases, however, have rejected this narrow “clinical issues” 
test and take a broader approach. In its 2006 decision in Ursic v. 
Ursic,71 the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision to impose 
joint custody in a high-conflict separation. The Court of Appeal relied 
heavily on a post-trial assessment by a mental health professional 
that had been ordered by the court as part of the appeal process. The 
appeal court noted the assessor’s opinion “buttressed” the trial 
decision, and the appellate court varied the details of the parenting 
plan to accord with the specific proposal of the assessor rather than 
the Judge’s original order. The Court of Appeal also commented 
favourably on the importance of the assessment undertaken after trial 
and before the appeal, as ordered by a judge of the Court of Appeal.  
 
The decision in Ursic recognized the value of the opinions of 
court-appointed mental health professionals in high-conflict child-
related disputes. Significantly, the Court of Appeal did not 
                                                     
70  2012 ONSC 3728 at paras 23-24. For a child welfare case where the court 
refused to order an assessment because the agency seeking the 
assessment failed to establish the possibility harm to the child from 
being placed in the care of her father, see Children’s Aid Society for the 
Region of Halton v N(RR), 2008 ONCJ 95, 170 ACWS (3d) 319 per Zisman 
J. 
71  [2006] OJ 2178 (CA), 32 RFL (6th) 23.  
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suggest that there needed to be a “clinical issue” before an 
assessment is ordered. Instead, the Court indicated that in a high-
conflict separation, it is sufficient for the assessment to be “useful.” 
In the 2013 Ontario decision Glick v. Cale, Kiteley J. extensively 
reviewed the jurisprudence and rejected the narrow “clinical issues” 
approach, citing the Court of Appeal decision in Ursic, observing 
that “judges are not trained to identify ‘clinical issues.’”72 Justice 
Kiteley suggested a non-exhaustive list of criteria which might assist 
a judge in deciding whether to order an assessment, including 
consideration of whether it is "high conflict" separation, and whether 
the children appear to be stressed or having behavioural problems.73 
It is submitted that the broader approach of Ursic, Glick v. Cale, and 
other recent cases74 is preferable to the narrower “clinical issues” 
approach in deciding whether to order an assessment, however, it 
is not appropriate to have an assessment in every contested child-
related dispute. The assessment process can be expensive for the 
parties, as well as intrusive for parents and children. If a request for 
an assessment is opposed, the onus is on the party seeking the 
assessment to establish the “evidentiary foundation” to establish the 
need for an assessment and that the benefits outweigh the costs. In 
family cases, a “bald assertion” that it is a “high conflict separation” 
may not suffice to obtain an order for an assessment; a party seeking 
an assessment may need to provide independent affidavit evidence 
of the negative effects of such issues as separation on the children, 
high conflict, problems with access, or parental dysfunction. 75  
 
                                                     
72  2013 ONSC 893, [2013] OJ 573 at para 45.    
73  Ibid at para 48.   
74  See e.g., Ryan v Scott, 2013 ONSC 4759, 2013 CarswellOnt 9783 per 
Mesbur J and KMP v JVER, 2016 YKSC 10. 
75  Morton v Morton, 2015 ONSC 4633, 2015 CarswellOnt 11038. 
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Lawyers (or self-represented parents) involved in cases should be 
satisfied about the experience and views of a professional nominated as 
the assessor. In many cases, the parties agree on the professional who 
will conduct the assessment. If there is no agreement, the supporting 
materials for the motion for appointment should include the curriculum 
vitae of the proposed assessors. The court should consider the expected 
cost and time to complete the assessment, as well as each assessor’s 
experience and issues of potential bias.  
 
In Karar v. Abo-El-Ella,76 the court ordered an assessment on 
consent, but the parties could not agree who would do the assessment. 
The mother’s counsel proposed a psychologist in the city where the 
parties resided, while the father’s counsel objected due to the mother’s 
profession as a psychiatrist and the possibility she might have had 
colleagues who knew the psychologist proposed (though there was no 
evidence of this). The father proposed a psychologist from a more 
distant city; the mother objected because the father claimed the mother 
alienated the children from him, and his proposed psychologist had 
written extensively about “parental alienation syndrome” and his 
personal experiences with his estranged son. In ordering the mother’s 
proposed psychologist to conduct the assessment, Beaudoin J. 
observed there was a “reasonable apprehension of bias” for the father’s 
proposed psychologist because of his published work, and concluded 
that the father’s concerns about the mother’s proposed assessor were 
“based on speculation.” 
 
Once an assessment is ordered, legislation generally provides that 
a report prepared by the assessor named in the order is “admissible” in 
evidence, which suggests that there is no need for a voir dire on its 
admissibility,77 though it is common for the court to conduct a process 
of qualifying the expert before that professional testifies.78  
                                                     
76  2016 ONSC 1564, 2016 CarswellOnt 4171, per Beaudoin J. 
77  If the order directs that the assessment is to be undertaken by one 
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PARTY-RETAINED CRITIQUE EVIDENCE OF COURT-
APPOINTED ASSESSORS 
 
It is clear that a party can retain and call its own qualified expert to 
challenge or limit the opinion of an expert called by the other party 
to testify. This is an inherent aspect of the adversarial process. 
Further, each party can cross-examine a court-appointed assessor 
and question the process adopted or opinions expressed.79 A party 
may also challenge the basis of an assessor’s opinions and 
recommendations, for example by calling other evidence to question 
the accuracy of the factual basis of the expert’s opinion. However, 
different issues arise when a party wants to call their own expert to 
challenge or “critique” the methodology or opinions of a court-
appointed assessor after the assessor’s report is prepared and filed 
with the court. While there is controversy about whether a party-
retained expert can challenge an opinion or recommendations 
expressed by an assessor appointed by the court, in our view, the 
preferable approach is to allow parties to introduce expert critique 
                                                                                                               
professional or member of the staff of a clinic and that person delegates 
significant portions of the assessment process to other professionals or staff 
members without the permission of the court, the report may not be 
admissible: see CAS London v B(CD), 2013 ONSC 2858, 2013 
CarswellOnt 8125, per Harper J. 
78  See e.g., Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton v W(A), 2016 ONCJ 358, 
2016 CarswellOnt 9713. 
79  The opportunity to test and cross-examine the recommendations of a court-
appointed assessor is critical, and as a result it will only be in “rare or 
exceptional” cases that a court will rely on an assessor’s recommendations 
at an interim hearing, as there is no opportunity to fully challenge those 
views; for one of those rare cases where a court did base an interim ruling 
to vary custody, see Ly v Wade, 2016 ONSC 1155, 2016 CarswellOnt 2418 
per Pazaratz J. 
Canadian Journal of Family Law [Vol. 30(1), 2017] 104 
testimony, provided that it meets the test for admission of expert 
evidence, and is appropriately focused. 
 
In the 2015 Ontario Court of Appeal judgement in M. v. F.,80 
Benotto J.A., in obiter, expressed concern about the utility and 
admissibility of “critique evidence” admitted at trial to challenge the 
opinions of a court-appointed assessor about appropriate parenting 
arrangements. This case involved a high conflict parenting dispute 
about overnight visitation with the father for a six year old boy, and 
the trial judge largely based his decision to allow overnight visits on 
the recommendation of the court-appointed psychologist. Justice 
Benotto upheld the trial decision, and noted that the court-appointed 
assessor had been involved with the family “for nearly all of the 
child's life,” while the psychologist retained by the mother to 
comment on the recommendations of the assessor had never met the 
child or parties in a clinical setting, and never met the father. Justice 
Benotto found the party-retained expert’s “self-described task was to 
‘raise concerns’ about the court-appointed assessment,” and 
concluded: 
 
It would be difficult to find that such evidence meets 
the criteria of Mohan [for the admission of expert 
evidence]. . . . critique evidence is rarely appropriate. 
It generally—as here—has little probative value, adds 
expense and risks elevating the animosity between the 
parties.81 
 
As Benotto J.A. explained, expert critique evidence about a 
court-appointed assessment must meet the Mohan (now White 
Burgess) test for admissibility. A restrictive approach to the second 
                                                     
80  Supra note 5. 
81  Ibid at paras 33–34. 
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stage “cost benefit” weighing for the admission is appropriate in a 
high conflict dispute between parents where the “critique expert” has 
not assessed the child.82 In these parenting dispute cases, the “cost” 
of admission of evidence from a party-retained expert, in terms of 
lengthening the proceedings and adding to their complexity, can be 
relatively high. Notably, on the facts of M. v. F., the parties both 
consented to the appointment of the assessor who was a psychologist 
well known to both as he had already been involved in mediation 
efforts with them. 
 
Issues of lengthening the trial and expense were especially 
pronounced in M. v. F., a long running high conflict parental dispute, 
which was focused not on whether the child would have a 
relationship with both parents, but rather on the details of the 
parenting plan. Significantly, and inappropriately, the psychologist 
whom the mother retained to provide a critique went so far as to 
make recommendations about the “ultimate issue” of the most 
suitable parenting plan and overnight visitation, without having 
assessed either the child or parents, or having established a basis for 
that opinion.  
 
In some cases, especially high conflict family cases involving 
claims of alienation, a party may retain a mental health professional 
to interview the child and express an opinion about the significance 
of those views that is contrary to that of the court-appointed 
assessor. Even if that professional has undertaken assessments and 
has been accepted as an expert in other family cases, the courts have 
had understandable concern about the limited value of such 
evidence. Similar to the approach in M. v. F., in such cases a court 
may decide that the expert opinion of such a professional is not 
admissible, though the statements made to the professional by the 
child are likely admissible hearsay under the “state of mind” 
                                                     
82  Mohan, supra note 11 at para 21; White Burgess, supra note 7 at para 19. 
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exception.83    
 
It is appropriate for a court in a case like M. v. F., dealing with a 
dispute between parents, to refuse to consider recommendations 
about the “best interests” of a child from a professional who has 
been retained by one party and not assessed both parents. Indeed, 
leading child custody evaluators84 and professional standards for 
mental health professionals highlight that it is not professionally 
appropriate to express opinions that reflect on a person whom the 
professional has not properly interviewed and assessed. However, 
there is also a significant body of literature85 and Canadian 
jurisprudence which recognizes a potentially valuable role for 
                                                     
83  See e.g., F(V) v Halton CAS, 2016 ONCJ 111, 2016 CarswellOnt 3035, 
where, in a very high conflict case, the court-appointed assessor had 
recommended a transfer of custody of a 13-year old girl to her father, from 
whom she had been alienated. The Family Court followed the assessor’s 
recommendation, and ordered custody to the father. In a child protection 
application brought by the child (with mother’s assistance), child’s counsel 
retained a social worker who had significant experience as an assessor to 
interview the girl and prepare a report. The court admitted the social 
worker’s statements of what the child told him (namely that she wanted to 
live with the mother). However, Kurz J. refused to admit his opinions about 
the girl’s competence to make decisions and perceptions of her parents, as 
the basis for these opinions had not been sufficiently established, since he 
had not interviewed both the parents and hence did not have sufficient basis 
for his opinions to be admitted as expert evidence. 
84  Birnbaum, Fidler & Kavassalis, supra note 63; William Austin et al, 
“Forensic Expert Roles and Services in Child Custody Litigation: Work 
Product Review and Case Consultation” (2011) 8:1-2 J Child Custody 47 
[Austin et al]; and H.D. Kirkpatrick, William Austin & James Flens, 
“Psychological and Legal Considerations in Reviewing the Work Product 
of a Colleague in Child Custody Evaluations” (2011) 8:1-2 J Child Custody 
103 [Kirkpatrick, Austin & Flens]. 
85  Ibid. 
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professionals retained by one party to comment on or review a report 
prepared by a court-appointed assessor. 
 
As recognized by the British Columbia Supreme Court in the 
2010 case Hejzlar v. Mitchell-Hejzlar, testimony by a party-retained 
psychologist who is a “critic” of a court-appointed psychologist is 
only admissible if it complies with the their professional standards, 
in this case the Code of Conduct of the BC College of Psychologists, 
which dictates what psychologists can do when they are reviewing 
the report of another psychologist: (a) they must limit comments to 
methods and procedures; (b) they must not state any conclusions 
unless they have done their own individual assessments; and (c) they 
must restrict themselves to comments as to their sufficiency and 
accuracy.86 
 
Judges of the British Columbia Supreme Court have continued 
to exercise their “gatekeeping function” and rule evidence 
inadmissible or give no weight to testimony from party-retained 
mental health professionals who are critical of the recommendations 
of a court-appointed assessor and reached conclusions about the 
“best interests” of children or make diagnoses about parents whom 
they have not met.87 Judges are especially concerned about opinions 
from party-retained professionals who lack experience in conducting 
assessments, and have become allied with the party who retained 
them. 
 
However, consistent with Hejzlar v. Mitchell-Hejzlar, the British 
Columbia courts have accepted that parties may retain qualified, 
experienced professionals who may review the assessor’s report and 
testify about the methodological limitations and recommendations of 
                                                     
86  2010 BCSC 1139, [2011] BCWLD 650 at para 11.  
87  See e.g., M v M [2015] BCJ 1584, 2015 BCSC 1297. 
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a court-appointed assessor, provided that they are not making their 
own recommendations about the most appropriate parenting plan or 
the child’s best interests. In some cases, including the recent 
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in A.S.P. v. N.N.J., 
considerable weight has been given to some of the opinions of a 
party-retained professional who has undertaken a review of the work 
of a court-appointed assessor as the basis for discounting the 
recommendations of the court-appointed assessor.88    
 
In the 2016 decision of the Ontario Superior in Luo v. Le,89 a 
case involving allegations of alienation, the court admitted a “reply 
report” from a social worker retained by the mother, commenting on 
the report of two court-appointed mental health professionals that 
had recommended reversal of custody from the mother to the father 
and attendance by family members at a controversial “intensive 
reunification” program in British Columbia. The court noted that the 
purpose of this reply report was to “assess the process” undertaken 
and recommendations made by the court-appointed experts. Justice 
Chaney observed that the reply report was “primarily a generic 
discussion of the uncertainty and debate surrounding the causes and 
appropriate interventions in relation to parental alienation.”90 While 
the judge suggested that the reply report in this case was “not very 
helpful,” it is notable that the court rejected the recommendation of 
the court-appointed experts, and used significant information from 
the party-retained expert in reaching his conclusion. Although the 
                                                     
88  2015 BCCA 415, [2015] BCJ 2121. However, for a recent British 
Columbia decision suggesting that admission of expert critique evidence in 
family cases about the report of a court-appointed assessor should be 
“rare,” see Dimitrijevic v Pavlovich, 2016 BCSC 1529, [2016] BCWLD 
6022.   
89  2016 ONSC 202, [2016] WDFL 1131. 
90  Ibid at para 26.  
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issue of the admissibility of the report of the mother’s expert does 
not appear to have directly arisen, it is significant that this evidence 
did not purport to be an assessment of the parties and child, did not 
offer recommendations about the child’s best interests, and would be 
admissible under the test set out in Hejzlar v. Mitchell-Hejzlar.  
 
The admission of the type of expert commentary on the 
methodology of a court-appointed assessor and a summary of 
“generic [social science] knowledge” is also consistent with 
standards proposed by leading forensic mental health 
professionals,91 who point out that given the wide variability in the 
education and experiences of those who undertake assessments, and 
the limited scope of professional regulation of this type of work, it is 
important to have external review of the work of assessors. Further, 
allowing for review testimony may encourage parties who are 
dissatisfied with the recommendations of an assessor to obtain their 
own objective, professional review, which, if it substantially 
confirms the original report, may facilitate settlement.   
 
CRITIQUE EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT-RETAINED 
EXPERTS 
 
In M. v. F. and similar cases, the courts were considering the 
admission of evidence from a mental health professional retained by 
a parent to testify about a report prepared by a court-appointed 
                                                     
91  Austin, Dale, Kirkpatrick & Flens, supra note 84; Birnbaum, Fidler & 
Kavassalis, supra note 63; Austin et al, supra note 84.  As noted above, in 
Dimitrijevic v Pavlovich, 2016 BCSC 1529 at para 37, Kent J. suggested 
that admission of expert critique evidence in family cases about the report 
of a court-appointed assessor should be “rare,” but he also observed that 
there was a role for part-retained experts to provide testimony about “peer-
reviewed, authoritative social science on parenting issues in dispute.”  
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assessor who was nominated by the court, either with the consent of 
both parties or at least with opportunity for them to make 
submissions about the selection of an assessor. It is submitted that 
when the government has had a role in the selection of the assessor, 
or is a party to the litigation, in considering the admissibility of 
critique evidence a different judicial cost-benefit analysis at the 
second stage of the Mohan and White Burgess tests is appropriate; 
courts should give parents who disagree with the opinions of a 
government-retained expert greater scope for introducing their own 
expert evidence to challenge those opinions.  
 
This situation may arise, for example, in family litigation in 
Ontario if a parent seeks the admission of evidence from a party-
retained expert to critique the report of a clinical investigator from 
the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).  Although the parties 
may have consented or had an opportunity to make submissions 
prior to the order requesting the involvement of the OCL, they have 
no involvement in the selection of the specific clinical investigator. 
While many OCL clinical investigators are highly competent and 
experienced, some may have less academic qualifications than the 
professionals undertaking court-ordered (and party paid) 
assessments under the CLRA s. 30,92 and they sometimes have only 
limited experience in the field.93  In a number of recent Ontario cases 
                                                     
92  Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c 12, s 30. 
93  See, however, Mayfield v Mayfield, [2001] OJ  2212, 18 RFL (5th) 328 
(SCJ), per Wein J., where the court refused to admit party-retained critique 
evidence about a report prepared by an OCL clinical investigator. This 
decision is problematic since the government selected OCL clinical 
investigator was undertaking one of her first assessments, and a parent was 
precluded from submitting testimony from a highly experienced assessor. 
In Greenough v Greenough, 46 RFL (5th) 414, [2003] OJ 4227 Quinn J. 
questioned Mayfield and held that a mother could call an expert whom she 
had retained to critique the methodology used by a psychologist whom both 
parents had agreed would undertake an assessment. 
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the courts have commented on the “bias”94 of a government-selected 
clinical investigator, the unreliability of the investigator’s 
conclusions about the presence of parental alienation,95 or the 
clinician’s under-appreciation of the effects of domestic violence.96 
In situations where the expertise of a government-selected assessor 
is questioned, there is a strong argument for the admission of 
critique evidence submitted by a party. 
 
There is also a strong argument for the admission of critique 
evidence from an expert retained by a parent concerning an 
assessment under the Child and Family Services Act s. 5497 for use 
in a child protection proceeding, where the state is a party and the 
order sought is severance of the parent-child relationship. An 
example of a flexible approach in child protection cases to the 
admission of expert critique evidence is provided by Children's Aid 
Society, Region of Halton v. W. (A.).98 The agency was seeking to 
have two children made permanent wards with the plan that they 
remain in kinship care with continuing parental contact, while the 
parents, who had separated by the time of the final trial, each wanted 
to resume care of the children. A court-appointed assessor undertook 
an initial parenting capacity assessment, and recommended that the 
children be made permanent wards and remain in their kinship 
placement. The mother, represented by counsel from a legal aid 
clinic, was able to retain an expert who had experience undertaking 
this type of assessment to testify about the methodology and 
psychological tests administered by the court-appointed assessor. 
                                                     
94  D’Angelo v Barrett, 2016 ONCA 605, [2016] WDFL 5155. 
95  Deacon v Haggith, 2016 ONSC 6360, [2016] WDFL 6493. 
96  Whidden v Ellwood, 2016 ONSC 6938, [2016] WDFL 6506. 
97  Supra note 13.  
98  2016 ONCJ 358, 2016 CarswellOnt 9713.   
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After conducting a voir dire, the court admitted the critique 
testimony as expert evidence, with O’Connell J. observing:  
 
In this case, the critique evidence . . . relates to a[n] . . 
. assessment under the CFSA for use in a child 
protection proceeding where the state is a party (and 
the applicant) to the proceeding and the order being 
sought is crown wardship—the permanent severance 
of the parent-child relationship. Further, the critique 
was solely concerned with the validity and reliability 
of the scientific testing conducted, as well as the 
methodology and process used. . . . 
 
The use of critique evidence by vulnerable parents in 
child protection proceedings commenced by the state 
against them is fundamentally different than the 
critique evidence used in a high conflict parenting 
dispute about overnight visitation, which was the case 
of M. v. F. . . . 99 
 
The court noted the critique expert was a “reasonable and 
reliable witness,” who “although hired by the mother, was not a 
‘hired gun.’”  In many other cases he had been a court-appointed 
assessor and this was only the third time that he had been retained to 
provide a critique of a court-appointed expert, and on the two prior 
occasions he found nothing wrong with the assessment and reported 
that to counsel.100 In this case, however, the expert raised significant 
                                                     
99  Ibid at paras 263–64. For another child protection case where the court 
admitted evidence from an experienced assessor who had retained by a 
parent to critique a report from a court-appointed expert, see The Children’s 
Aid Society of Simcoe (County) v D(B), 2014 ONSC 2140 (Div Ct), aff’d 
2013 ONSC 1610. 
100  Supra note 98 at para 266.  
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concerns about the tests and methodology used by the court-
appointed assessor, including use of outdated tests and conducting 
all of the interviews and tests of the parents on a single day, contrary 
to normal practice, though fairly noting that it could not be known 
whether these concerns would have affected the ultimate opinion. 
The court concluded that in light of the critique of the party-retained 
expert, it should treat the conclusions of the court-appointed assessor 
“with considerable caution and placed very little, if any weight” on 
the opinions of the assessor.101  In the end, however, the court made 
the order sought by the agency based on other evidence. The 
decision of O’Connell J. in Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton 
v. W. (A.), illustrates the importance of taking account of the role of 
the state in obtaining expert evidence in considering how to 
undertake the cost-benefit analysis of admitting critique expert 
evidence put forward by a parent. 
 
Even in child protection cases, however, scrutiny should be 
given to the admission of evidence from “critique experts” who have 
no direct knowledge of the parents or children, and little or no 
experience with undertaking assessments, but rather are retained 
solely to comment on the process used in an assessment. In C.A.S. 
of Toronto v. O.(K.),102 the African-Canadian mother of twin girls 
who were Crown wards and the subject of a status review hearing 
proposed to call a professional with a doctorate in education to 
critique a psychologist’s court-ordered assessment, specifically to 
testify about the unreliability of some of the psychological tests 
performed for members of cultural minority groups. Justice Spence 
concluded that the “threshold reliability” test of Mohan was not 
satisfied, based on the “lack of research on the subject in the 
scientific community” within which the proposed expert worked. 
                                                     
101  Ibid at para 268.   
102   [2004] OJ No 630, 50 RFL (5th) 298 (Ont CJ), per Spence J [O(K)]. 
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The mother also wanted the expert to testify about the lack of 
“cultural sensitivity” of the agency in dealing with visible 
minority children. Justice Spence ruled that the proposed expert 
could not establish he had current knowledge of the practices of the 
agency, and hence was not qualified to express an opinion on that 
subject. Further, the parts of the proposed testimony concerning the 
lack of “racial and cultural sensitivity” of the agency did not meet 
the Mohan criteria of “necessity”, since these matters were “within 
the experience of triers of fact who live in such a diverse place as 
the city of Toronto. . . .”103 The judge also expressed a concern that 
the proposed expert, while a distinguished academic and community 
member, appeared to be coming to court “more as an advocate 
rather than as a scientist,” as he was prepared to proffer an opinion 
without even having seen the assessment report in question and had 
no direct experience in undertaking assessments.104 
 
EXPERTS CALLED BY PARENTS AND “ONE-SIDED 
ASSESSMENTS” 
 
Given the limited resources of parents involved in family and child 
protection litigation, and the importance of perspectives of 
professionals involved with the family, it is submitted that there 
should not be too high of a threshold for the admission of opinion 
evidence from “participant professionals” with direct knowledge of 
a parent’s case (as a result of providing services to the parents or 
children). Of course, the ultimate weight of this evidence will be for 
the court to determine.105  
                                                     
103  Ibid at para 47.  
104  Ibid at para 39. 
105  Ibid. See also Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of 
Waterloo v L, 2004 ONCJ 116, [2004] OJ No 2996 and Children’s Aid 
Society of Toronto v T(C), 2006 ONCJ 548, 36 RFL (6th) 443 (Ont Ct J). 
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Although a qualified professional who has treated a parent or 
child should generally be permitted to express an opinion about that 
person,106 such a professional should not be permitted to express an 
opinion about the parenting arrangement that will promote the 
child’s best interests, as they have not assessed the entire family.107  
While there may be concerns that a professional who is treating a 
parent, or who is retained by one parent in a high conflict separation 
to provide treatment to a child, may become “allied” with that parent 
and hence “los[e] some objectivity,”108 this type of concern should 
normally only affect the weight of that expert’s evidence rather than 
its admissibility. It is important to appreciate that in some cases a 
therapist or doctor who has had a long-term relationship with a 
parent or child may have opinions and information about their 
patient or client that are better founded than those of a court-
appointed assessor.109   
 
While there is an important role for participant experts in child 
related cases, there should be careful scrutiny of the admissibility of 
litigation experts retained by one parent solely to provide an opinion 
to the court. In family disputes, there are not infrequently concerns 
about unreliability and potential bias as a basis for refusing to admit 
testimony from a mental health professional who has been retained 
                                                     
106  See e.g., Livisianos v Liadis, 2016 ONCJ 292, [2016] WDFL 3947 [Liadis], 
per Zisman J. where the court placed significant weight on testimony from 
a counsellor who worked with the mother for more than a year on parenting 
issues. 
107  See e.g., Williamson v Williamson, 2016 BCCA 87, [2016] 7 WWR 263. 
108  Brownstone J., in Catholic Children’s Aid Society v CS, [2010] OJ 5831, 
2010 ONCJ 656 at para 36; see also e.g., M v M, supra note 95. 
109  See e.g., Children's Aid Society for the Region of Halton v N (RR), 2008 
ONCJ 95, [2008] OJ No 870 (CJ). 
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to undertake a “one-sided assessment” that purports to comment on a 
parenting plan without having met both parents.110    
 
CHILD PROTECTION AGENCY STAFF AND RETAINED 
EXPERTS 
 
In a child welfare hearing, it is not uncommon for the child protection 
agency to seek to introduce expert opinion evidence from 
professionals whom the agency employs or regularly retains. These 
staff or retained professionals may have been providing services to a 
child or to the parents before the case goes to a hearing, or may be 
involved in making plans for the child’s future.  
 
There is no doubt that properly qualified child protection agency 
staff and professionals retained by the agency can give expert 
evidence, and there is also some scope for child protection staff to 
provide “lay opinion” evidence about such matters as parental 
affection and demeanour.  However, there are potentially 
contentious issues about the extent to which agency staff social 
workers should be permitted to express opinions about the central 
issues before the court. For example, in Catholic Children’s Aid 
Society of Hamilton Wentworth v. S. (J.), Steinberg U.F.C.J. 
observed: 
 
I note that some of the commentators . . . have written 
regarding a certain laxity . . . in certain [family] 
Courts toward admission of expert evidence. . . . That 
view ought not to apply in [child protection] cases 
                                                     
110  See e.g., Liadis, supra note 106 at para 34 where in dispute between two 
parents about parenting arrangements, Zisman J. refused to qualify as an 
expert and admit as evidence a report prepared by a social worker, Ms. 
Kendal, retained by the father solely for commenting on his proposed 
parenting plan and his capacities as a parent. 
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where the contested issue is whether or not a child 
should be made a Crown ward and adopted or 
returned home. . . . This issue is of such importance 
that laxity or latitude in the admission of expert 
evidence ought not to be accepted. 111 
 
A consideration of the issues at stake in a child protection 
proceeding and of the principles articulated in the Supreme Court 
expert evidence jurisprudence can help courts to decide whether to 
admit opinion evidence from agency staff. A major concern reflected 
in Supreme Court decisions is the apparent lack of independence of 
some expert witnesses. In Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. W., 
Mackinnon J. ruled that a child protection CAS worker who had a key 
role in the agency’s decision-making process to seek permanent 
wardship was not qualified to give “expert evidence” about the 
appropriateness of that position.  The judge observed that she “also 
wish[ed] to highlight the caution to be exercised before accepting a 
staff employee as an expert witness for that party on an issue central to 
the outcome of the case.”112 While White Burgess clearly establishes 
that being an employee of a party to litigation does not prevent a 
                                                     
111  [1986] OJ No 1866, 9 CPC (2d) 265 (Ont UFC). 
112  Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v W(C), [2008] OJ 1151, [2008] WDFL 
4013 (SCJ), per Mackinnon J. at para 93, [emphasis added] quoting from 
Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v JD and DD, (2 October 2003) Ottawa 
94-FL-0615D (SCJ) Toscano-Roccamo J. See also Children’s Aid Society 
of the Niagara Region v M(D), [2002] OJ 1421 (SCJ (Fam Ct)) at paras 
19–20. Similar concerns were raised about the use of Crown retained 
experts in criminal cases in the Goudge Inquiry Report. See also David 
Paciocco, “Taking a ‘Goudge’ out of Bluster and Blarney: An ‘Evidence-
Based Approach’ to Expert Testimony” (2009) 13 Can Crim L Rev 135; 
and Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, “A Contextual Approach to the 
Admissibility of the State’s Forensic Science and Medical Evidence” 
(2011) 61UTLJ 343. 
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properly qualified child protection agency staff member from 
providing expert evidence,113 the comments of Mackinnon J. point to 
the need for courts to carefully consider the relationship of the 
proffered expert as one of the factors to weigh in deciding whether to 
admit the evidence.  
 
If there is a concern about an agency staff member providing 
expert opinion evidence, there should be a voir dire to establish that 
person’s expertise and whether those opinions should be admissible as 
expert evidence. The fact that a person is on agency staff should be 
considered by the trial judge in determining both the admissibility and 
weight of the evidence. Issues of institutional bias or impartiality 
may also arise with a psychologist in private practice if a significant 
portion of his or her professional practice is based on referrals from 
the local child protection agency. Chief Judge Stuart of the Yukon 
Territorial Court recognized the subtle but potentially “insidious 
nature” of a parenting capacity assessment prepared by an expert 
regularly retained by the child protection agency:  
 
The party calling an expert has more than just a subtle 
influence over the nature of expert testimony. In 
selecting, directing, and paying for expert testimony, 
the department gains a significant advantage over the 
parents. . . . to ensure the integrity of the process 
and to give meaning to fundamental principles of 
justice, the use of expert evidence must be fair.  
 
Several options exist to ensure expert evidence does 
not undermine a parent’s ability to effectively 
participate, and thereby ensure a child’s best interests 
are fairly and properly determined. To avoid 
                                                     
113  See e.g., Chatham-Kent Children's Services v T(MCA), 2015 ONCJ 209, 
[2015] WDFL 2528. 
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unnecessary costs, one expert can often suffice . . . 
Input on the selection and focus of the expert can be 
made in court by all parties. . . .114 
 
In the Northwest Territories case of Re A,115 the judge admitted the 
testimony of a psychologist retained by the Director of Child and 
Family Services and accepted as an expert by the parents, but gave the 
testimony very little weight due to concerns about bias and cultural 
insensitivity. The psychological testing of the parents, which included 
a standardized IQ test, was normed using the general Canadian 
population. The judge took judicial notice that the Inuvialuit 
population—of which both parents were members—was markedly 
different than the general Canadian population and likely 
underrepresented in the population used to norm the tests. This caused 
the judge to have “considerable difficulty with the accuracy of the 
intelligence measures” as presented by the expert witness.116 Further, 
in cross-examination the expert conceded that when faced with two 
conflicting test results, he chose to rely on the test that showed the 
greater potential for the children being at higher risk, as this offered the 
children the most protection. This approach caused the court 
considerable concern, and the judge observed: 
 
Evidence must be interpreted in an impartial and 
neutral manner. At the end of the day when 
determining what orders are to be made, the best 
interests of the children must be the court's only 
consideration. However, that cannot require that each 
piece of evidence must be interpreted in a manner that 
                                                     
114  Re RA, 2002 YKTC 28, [2002] YJ No. 48 (Terr Ct) at paras 226–234 [Re 
RA]. 
115  2013 NWTTC 9, 2013 CarswellNWT 29 [Re A]. 
116  Ibid at para 33.  
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favours the children being placed in the Director's 
care and custody. . . .  
 
I do not necessarily believe that Dr. X was colouring 
his testimony to support the Director's position. . . . 
Nevertheless, his stated approach to interpreting the 
results of the tests he administered is dubious and 
calls into question his general objectivity.117 
 
Concerns about bias and potential unreliability of professionals 
regularly retained by child protection agencies and often effectively 
“allied” with the agency were also highlighted in the recent Lang 
Review of expert testimony from the Motherisk Laboratory in 
Toronto.118 
 
THE MOTHERISK CASES AND EXPERT EVIDENCE IN 
CHILD WELFARE CASES 
 
While expert evidence in child-related cases is most commonly from 
mental health professionals and based on social sciences, there have 
also been serious concerns about expert medical or “hard science” 
evidence in these cases, especially child welfare cases.  
 
In 2008, the Goudge Commission Report documented the effects 
of misleading expert testimony of forensic paediatric pathologist Dr. 
Charles Smith of Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children. Dr. Smith’s 
now discredited testimony resulted in a number of wrongful criminal 
convictions, and at least one case where a child was removed from 
                                                     
117  Ibid at paras 40–44. 
118  Lang Review, supra note 4. Although the Motherisk Laboratory was part of 
the Hospital for Sick Children and did some private hair analysis work, for 
example for family law cases, the vast majority of its hair analysis work 
was done for Ontario Children’s Aid Societies. 
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parental care, made a Crown ward, and adopted.119 Concerns about 
the reliability of expert evidence in child abuse and neglect cases 
were again an issue as a result of the 2014 Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision in R v. Broomfield,120 where a mother’s criminal conviction 
for giving her infant cocaine was based largely on testimony by a 
toxicology expert from the Motherisk Laboratory at Toronto’s 
Hospital for Sick Children, Dr. Gideon Koren. Dr. Koren and the 
Laboratory were frequented retained by child protection agencies, 
and occasionally by the police, to test hair for possible drug or 
alcohol use. The expert testified based on analysis of the child’s hair 
that the infant had ingested cocaine over a lengthy period. At trial, 
the Crown’s expert had been the only expert to testify. After being 
convicted and imprisoned, the mother obtained assistance for an 
appeal from the relatively well-resourced Association in Defence of 
the Wrongly Convicted.121 In overturning the conviction, the Court 
of Appeal noted, “[a] live controversy at trial was whether the victim 
exhibited any behavioural signs consistent with chronic exposure to 
significant amounts of cocaine.” 122 However, the mother, due to lack 
of resources, had no expert at the criminal trial, a trial by judge 
alone, to challenge the opinions expressed by the Crown’s expert, 
and his evidence “remained unshaken” in cross-examination at trial. 
In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeal found, as a result of 
fresh expert evidence adduced by the defence and admitted on 
appeal, that “the trial judge made her decision unaware of the 
                                                     
119  Canada, Commission of the Inquiry into Pediatric Foresnic Pathology in 
Ontario: Report by The Honourable Stephen T Goudge (Ottawa: Ontario 
Ministry of the Attorney General, 2008).  
120  R v Broomfield, 2014 ONCA 725; [2014] OJ No 4903. 
121  See Pamela Stephenson Welch, “Motherisk: Total and Unquestioned 
Reliance on Science with Dire Consequences” (26 August 2015), online: 
<https://www.aidwyc.org/motherisk-blog/>. 
122  Supra note 120 at para 7. 
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genuine controversy among the experts about the use of the testing 
methods relied upon by the Crown expert at trial to found a 
conclusion of chronic cocaine ingestion.”123 
 
A number of child protection agencies in Ontario and other 
provinces used the Motherisk hair analysis test results for 
investigative and case planning purposes. After the Court of Appeal 
decision in Broomfield, the Attorney General of Ontario appointed 
the Honourable Susan Lang to undertake a review to assess the 
adequacy and reliability of hair analysis evidence used in child 
protection and criminal proceedings.124 Justice Lang reported in 
December 2015 that the hair-testing process used was “inadequate 
and unreliable” and the use of evidence from the lab “had serious 
implications for the fairness of child protection and criminal 
cases.”125 The Hospital for Sick Children closed the Motherisk 
Laboratory in April 2015.126     
                                                     
123  Ibid at para 12. 
124  Lang Review, supra note 4. Since the Review process began, parents’ 
counsel have begun to call their own experts to challenge Motherisk experts 
and courts have given much less weight to Motherisk reports: see e.g., 
Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v BM, 2015 NSSC 145, 
[2015] WDFL 3236. 
125  Lang Review, supra note 4. As recommended by the Lang Review, on 
December 22, 2015 the Ontario government established a second review to 
directly address individual cases. The Beaman Review, headed by a retired 
judge of the Ontario Court of Justice Judith Beaman, has an initial two-year 
mandate that focuses on providing support for individual parents and 
children who come forward with claims that they have been affected by 
flawed Motherisk hair test analysis. The Beaman Review has found at least 
10 cases where the Motherisk tests likely played an important role 
throughout the process to remove a child from their family, including the 
temporary removal orders made by courts along the way. Sandra Contenta, 
Jim Rankin, & Rachel Mendleson, “Motherisk tests played role in 10 
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The Court of Appeal decision in Broomfield and the Lang 
Review did not directly address the issue of whether the testimony of 
staff from the Laboratory was insufficiently reliable as “novel 
science” to even be admitted, or merely insufficiently reliable to be 
given much weight.  However, arguably, if the limitations of this 
evidence were known by the courts, it should not even have been 
admissible.  
 
Issues related to use of Motherisk hair analysis serve as 
important reminders of the challenges inherent in the admission of 
and reliance on expert evidence. This paper does not directly 
consider the many complex issues that arise from the Motherisk 
cases and the Lang Review, except to argue that concerns related to 
expert evidence in child protection cases raise issues under the 
Charter of Rights.127 The Canadian courts have accepted that there 
are cases where s.7 of the Charter and the “principles of 
fundamental justice” require a court to order that the state provide 
counsel for parents in child protection cases without resources, so 
there may be a fair trial process.128 It is also clear that there are 
                                                                                                               
families where children taken, first phase of review finds,” Toronto Star 
(28 October 2016), online: <www.thestar.com>. 
126  Rachel Mendleson, “Sick Kids shuts down hair tests at Motherisk lab”, The 
Star (17 April 2015), online: <www.thestar.com>. 
127  For a fuller discussion of the basis for a Charter order for government 
funding of an expert, see Nicholas Bala & Jane Thomson, “Motherisk and 
Charter Orders for Experts for Parents in Child Welfare Cases” (2016) 35:2 
Can Fam LQ 199. 
128  New Brunswick v G (J), [1999] 3 SCR 46, [1999] SCJ No 47; and R v 
Rowbotham, 1988 CarswellOnt 58, [1988] O.J. No. 271. In a criminal case, 
it is common for the court to order a stay unless the accused has counsel, 
while in child protection cases this is not an appropriate remedy and courts 
will directly order representation for indigent parents. 
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cases, like Broomfield, where state-funded experts called by the 
Crown or a child protection agency are providing critical, and 
sometimes novel, scientific evidence. These are cases where, without 
appropriate challenging of a state-retained expert by an expert 
retained by the parents, the process may not accord with the 
principles of fundamental justice and may result in a miscarriage of 
justice. We argue that, in appropriate cases, the court may make an 
order for funding an expert for indigent parents under the Charter of 
Rights s. 7.  This argument is especially strong in cases that involve 
medical or hard science evidence, which counsel and judges 
typically have greater difficulty in understanding and challenging 
compared to social science based testimony. 
 
While there is no Canadian jurisprudence that directly deals with 
this issue, American case law establishes that, in appropriate cases 
involving termination of parental rights, the constitutional right to 
due process and a fair trial requires that the court order the state to 
pay to allow parents to retain an expert to consult with counsel and 
prepare a report to challenge an expert retained by a child protection 
agency.129 These arguments should also be persuasive in Canada, 
where vital liberty and security of the person interests of parents and 
children are at stake in child protection proceedings, and the 
principles of fundamental justice may require that parents have 
access to their own experts to challenge expert evidence proffered by 
the government. 
                                                     
129  See In Re Egbert Children, 651 NE (2d) 38 (Ohio Ct App, 1994). In Ake v 
Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (1985) where the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that an indigent criminal defendant had the constitutional right 
to have the state provide a psychiatric evaluation to be used in this defense. 
See also Paul Giannelli, “Ake v Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance 
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World” (2004) 89 Cornell L Rev 1305.  
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CONCLUSION: ADDRESSING CHALLENGES IN USE OF 
EXPERT EVIDENCE 
 
It is essential for lawyers, judges, and other professionals involved in 
the justice system to understand the role of expert evidence in child-
related cases. Experts, in particular mental health professionals, have 
a critical role in assisting courts, lawyers, and parents in making 
decisions about children and their parents. Experts in child-related 
cases, however, must have appropriate education and be familiar 
with evolving research. Their reports should always identify their 
role (court-appointed or party-retained), the procedures that they 
have adopted, and the limitations of their work. While mental health 
professionals may have important evidence for a child-related case, 
it is also vital for lawyers, judges, and mental health professionals to 
be aware of the limitations and challenges accompanying the use of 
such evidence. 
 
Court-ordered assessments undertaken by qualified, independent 
professionals using accepted methodologies and standards can assist 
courts in making the most appropriate decisions about children, and 
these assessments can also play a significant role in facilitating 
settlements,130 an especially important concern in child-related cases.  
 
There are legislative provisions or rules of court in each 
province that permit assessments to be ordered by a court in child-
                                                     
130  See e.g., Nicholas Bala & Alan Leschied, “Court-Ordered Assessments In 
Ontario Child Welfare Cases: Review And Recommendations For Reform” 
(2008), 24 Can J Fam L 1, which presents data on a study of Ontario 
lawyers and judges who reported that an independent court-ordered 
assessment in a child protection case often results in a settlement of a case. 
See also comments of Mackinnon J in Hayes v Goodfellow, 2011 ONSC 
3362, [2011] WDFL 4395 at para 6: “Experience also shows that the 
prospect of settlement is significantly enhanced by the availability of an 
assessment report. With it, the entire trial may have proven unnecessary.” 
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related cases, and there is guidance in the standards of some 
professional organizations about how assessments are to be 
undertaken. However, there is an absence in Canada of government 
regulation and accreditation of those who undertake this most 
important work. Although many who undertake assessments are well 
trained, appropriately educated, and skilled, some are not. Some who 
prepare these reports are members of regulated professions and 
subject to some type of government-mandated regulation, while 
others who do these assessments are not members of regulated 
professions;131 further, even for those who are members of regulated 
professions, the regulation is not focused on this type of forensic 
work.  
 
Although the scope of their evidence and opinions should not be 
as broad as the testimony of court-appointed experts, professionals 
retained and called as a witness by one party can also have an 
important role in the resolution of child-related disputes. One of the 
contentious issues raised by the Ontario Court of Appeal decision M. 
v. F.132 is the involvement a party-retained expert in a child-related 
case providing a review of the report of a court-appointed assessor. 
While there are professional standards for assessments by mental 
health professionals in child-related cases, there is a lack of clear 
professional standards about how to undertake and testify about a 
forensic review.133 A growing body of literature provides helpful 
                                                     
131 British Columbia, 2010; Saskatchewan, 2001; Alberta, 2002; Newfoundland 
& Labrador, 2007; and Ontario, 2009, 2014, supra note 60. 
132  Supra note 5. 
133  In Ontario, the College of Psychologists (2014) Task Force released an 
informational set of guidelines for those members who perform child 
custody and parenting capacity assessments. The document specifically 
refers to a mental health professional who provides consultation for court 
purposes and critiquing an assessor’s work, though it does not provide 
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guidance for mental health professionals retained by one party’s 
lawyer in a child-related case,134 but professional organizations 
should address in a more systematic way the ethical and other issues 
that arise when undertaking a review for forensic purposes. It is 
important for professionals to be reminded about and accountable 
for maintaining objectivity and independence, especially when 
retained for a forensic review of a colleague’s work. There are also 
practical issues that need to be addressed about the admission of 
such critique evidence: for example, when and how the reviewer 
should be given access to notes and data used by the original 
assessor to allow for a complete review; and when the reviewer 
should be allowed (or required) to discuss the case with the original 
assessor. 
 
A lawyer in a child-related case may also retain a mental health 
professional to provide assistance in preparing a client for an 
assessment or to assist the lawyer in understanding an assessment 
report and cross-examining the assessor. As with other roles 
concerning child-related assessments, in Canada at present there is a 
lack of professional guidance about this “litigation consultant” role 
for mental health professionals;135 can, for example, a professional 
                                                                                                               
much detail on this topic. See the College of Psychologists of Ontario, “E-
news Bulletin”, (2015) 6:2, online: <http://www.cpo.on.ca/Resources>. 
134  Jonathan Gould et al, “Testifying Experts and Non-testifying Trial 
Consultants: Appreciating the Differences” (2011) 8:1-2 J. Child Custody 
32; and Mark Juhas, “Commentary on Forensic Mental Health Consulting: 
Is More Better?” (2011) 8:1-2 J Child Custody 124; Kirkpatrick, Austin & 
Flens, supra note 84. 
135  See e.g., Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Child Custody 
Consultant Task Force, Mental Health Consultants and Child Custody 
Evaluations: A Discussion Paper (2011) 49 Fam Ct Rev 723; Austin et al, 
supra note 84; and Kirkpatrick, Austin & Flens, supra note 84. 
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who has been a litigation consultant maintain sufficient objectivity 
to also be an expert witness?  
 
As with many other issues related to the family justice system, 
some of the most pressing challenges concerning experts relate to a 
lack of resources and inadequate access to the services of qualified 
mental health professionals for this type of work. Lack of training, 
education, and support has resulted in too few professionals who can 
do this type of work, and often significant delays in getting access to 
those who do it; the delay in obtaining an assessment may cause 
delay in the resolution of cases about children, who experience 
added stress as their cases are prolonged. While some parents, like 
those in M. v. F., can afford to retain these professionals, many 
cannot. In some jurisdictions there is some access to government 
funded or subsidized services, but in many places in Canada there 
are lengthy delays in obtaining these services, and in too many 
places they are unavailable. As discussed in this paper, there may be 
situations in child welfare cases where claims can be made under the 
Charter to require the provision of expert assistance to parents, but 
in most situations, these critical resource questions are matters of 
political will and wisdom. It is hoped that those responsible for the 
justice system will recognize the importance of mental health 
professionals for making sound decisions about children, and devote 
sufficient resources to allow this to occur.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
